Lies, Bullshits, and “Inbetweenies"

FLORENCIA RIMOLDI

Ciudad de Buenos Aires

Encuentro; Encuentro de Epistemología Social; 2011

SADAF

In this comment on prof. Lackey´s paper, I will focus on deliberative groups, and I will try to argue that if these groups really do have all the properties Lackey claims they have (being rational, irrational, moral, inmoral, etc), then Minimal Sumativism cannot be the correct account of group belief. To do this, I will first show how we could understand the relation between the beliefs of a group and the beliefs of its members by means of the relation of direct responsiveness. By establishing an analogy between individual beliefs and group beliefs, I will argue that the commonsensical view is that while the first are directly responsive to evidence, the second are directly responsive to the beliefs of its members. By considering, however, what is at stake when we claim that groups are rational at the collective level, I will argue that sometimes the beliefs of a group must detach from the beliefs of its members, just as sometimes the beliefs of an individual must detach from evidence. This supports some moderate non summativist view. The conclusion of the comment will be, then, that giving an account of deliberative groups is not compatible with her summativist position, but that this is not an obstacle for moral or legal accountability. This last claim will be supported by examples from the individual beliefs analogy