The Limits of Joseph Raz's Account on Legal Reasoning

PAULA GAIDO

Buenos Aires

Simposio; Constitutional Interpretation and Legal Positivism; 2015

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Joseph Raz's draws our attention on the conceptual link between legal norms and reasons for action. We cannot understand what legal norms are without understanding their role in our practical reasoning. In this paper I want to challenge some of Raz's theses on legal reasoning, having his theory of law as background. Raz argues that constitutional interpretation and judicial adjudication are both fundamentally based on moral argument, where the voice of the legitimate legal authority is just a first voice. My point is that, given his methodological starting point, he has to maintain that moral arguments are ruled out not only from the identification of law, but also from the adjudication of particular cases, at least where there is settled law.