Authority, Coercion, and Rational Self-Interest in Locke's Theory of Political Obligation

VENEZIA, LUCIANO

Arlington, Virginia

Conferencia; Speaker Series; 2018

Institute of Humane Studies, George Mason University

According to the usual interpretation of John Locke?s account of political authority and obligation, the directives issued by the sovereign not only impose obligations, but also provide authoritative reasons that, as such, motivate the subjects to fulfil them. This analysis of the way the commands of political authority affect subjects? practical reasoning receives textual support from a handful of passages in the Second Treatise of Government, including the well-known discussion in section 87 where Locke writes that the directives of the sovereign are similar to the decisions of a referee.At the same time, this account of the way legal directives affect subjects? practical reasoning is poorly related to the moral theory developed in An Essay concerning Human Understanding and other works, which, for their part, suggest a different account of the reasons subjects have for complying with the directives issued by political authority. Attempting to remedy this defect, in this paper I will put forward a revisionist reading that does justice not only to Locke?s account as developed in the Second Treatise, but also to the fundamental theses of his moral theory laid out in the Essay and other texts.The revisionist reading that I will introduce in the paper states that the commands issued by the sovereign do introduce morally binding obligations on the subjects, yet these duties are not practical in themselves, that is, they do not give reasons which motivate the subjects to comply with the law. Instead, the revisionist interpretation claims that the reasons for fulfilling the obligations imposed by the law are related to the sanctions for non-compliance that are normally linked to most juridical norms. In particular, the revisionist reading argues that sovereign commands function as a factual minor premise in a larger practical syllogism intended to explain political obedience. Contrary to what is usually assumed, this interpretation of Locke?s political philosophy thus states that political obligation and motivation have different sources and explanations.