INVESTIGADORES
VENEZIA Luciano Javier
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
What Difference Does the Sovereing Make?
Autor/es:
VENEZIA, LUCIANO
Lugar:
Porto Alegre
Reunión:
Seminario; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; 2016
Institución organizadora:
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Universidade Federal de Rio Grande do Sul
Resumen:
The introduction of the sovereign in the commonwealth has several implications and effects. For instance, it permits stable peace to be brought about and property rights and justice to come into place. It also makes a difference for subjects? practical reasoning. Yet there seem to be two different ways to construe this difference introduced by sovereign power in the commonwealth. According to the non-normative view, the sovereign?s key feature is its causal or empirical capacity to force the subjects to follow the laws of nature and so act in ways that are already reasonable. In this sense, the sovereign and his main instrument ? law ? merely make an empirical difference to the subjects? practical reasoning. For its part, the normative view states that the sovereign?s main characteristic is its normative power to impose morally binding obligations on the subjects, which as such do not have a direct link with the natural duties imposed by natural laws. In this interpretation, the difference introduced by sovereign power in civil society is normative rather than causal or empirical.The evidence where Hobbes explicitly mentions the characteristic inequality of the commonwealth can be plausibly interpreted in either non-normative as well as in normative ways. Even so, there are strong considerations in favor of the normative reading. In particular, Hobbes?s analysis of the normativity of contractual obligations grounds the idea that there are normative differences between the sovereign and his subjects. There are also additional considerations for preferring this theory. First, Hobbes?s command theory of law supports the normative view. Next, the theory which states that there are only causal or empirical differences between the sovereign and his subjects is poorly related to a genuine contractarian theory of political obligation; in fact, it does not get a theory of political obligation off the ground. Finally, the way sanctions for non-compliance affect practical reasoning give further reasons in favor of the normative interpretation.