The Hobbesian Analysis of Promises and Contracts Made under Coercion: a Critique

VENEZIA, LUCIANO

Lovaina

Workshop; Fourth Meeting of the European Hobbes Society; 2013

Hobbes´s ideas on contracts and promises are extremely counter-intuitive. Surely actions made under coercion or duress are not fully voluntary in the required normative sense, which would explain why they are not morally binding. However, important scholars--notably Claire Finkelstein--have recently written important essays on this topic trying to find a way of understanding whay sort of theory would be required in order to make sense, if not to defend, Hobbes´s theory, at least in some contexts. Thus, according to what I call in this paper the "Hobbesian" analysis of promises and contracts made under coercion or duress, it is not just a psychological fact that agents feel bound by agreements reached under coercion or duress; according to the Hobbesian theory they have a genuine moral obligation to act as they have promised or consented to. In this paper, I analyze both Hobbes´s arguments to ground such a claim via a particular understanding of agency and voluntariness. I also take into consideration some points introduced by Finkelstein to make Hobbes´s view less counterintuitive. My conclusion is that the Hobbesian attempt to rationally ground the claim that contracts and promises made under coercion or duress are in many cases voluntary in the required sense and therefore that they may be binding does not really succeed.