Raz's Normative Theory of Authority: An Internal Critique

VENEZIA, LUCIANO

Berlín

Seminario; Collquium in Practical Philosophy; 2012

Humboldt-Universität

In this paper I will first show that there is more to Raz?s normative theory than the ?service conception? of authority, contrary to the traditional interpretation of his account. Raz?s view also includes important remarks on when subjects are duty-bound to comply with mistaken authoritative directives, which introduces further normative considerations into the whole normative theory. In the second place, I will argue that the service conception is at odds with Raz?s further remarks on mistakes. The whole account is inconsistent: it entails that, in some circumstances, subjects both have and do not have a duty to obey directives issued by seriously mistaken authorities. Finally, I will maintain that this issue puts serious pressure on the service conception because, as far as I can see, Raz?s account of mistakes is fundamentally sound.