Are Unjust Laws Binding?

VENEZIA, LUCIANO

Coventry

Seminario; Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs Seminar; 2023

Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs

Christopher Wellman puts forward a series of arguments for the thesis that a legitimate authority’s unjust orders are not binding. First, he maintains that, given that proportionality is what fills the gap between legitimacy and justice, there is no way to account for the fact that a legitimate authority acts permissibly when it acts unjustly, so that it can indirectly account for the fact that its unjust orders are binding. Second, he argues that a legitimate authority’s unjust orders are not binding because the combatants who obey unjust orders may not invoke the fact that they are merely following orders as a defense for performing unjust acts; because promises to commit injustices—even minor injustices—are null and void; and because an argument from analogy establishes it.I argue that Wellman’s arguments are either inconclusive or, when properly amended, do not show that a legitimate authority’s unjust orders are not binding. I also offer an example involving a legitimate authority issuing a moderately unjust order and explain why the order is binding. With the example and explanation, I make a positive case for the thesis that a legitimate authority’s moderately unjust orders are sometimes binding.