Teleology Reference´s Problem

LERUSSI, NATALIA

Catania

Congreso; Multilateral Kant Colloquium: Kant and the Contemporary; 2018

Universidad de Catania/ Kant in Southamerica (Marie-Curie Cooperation Program)

Among Kant´s teleology researchers there persists an implicit or explicit discussion between two different points of view. On the one hand, there are those who argue that there are some characteristics of organized beings (or organisms) that justify us having to comprehend them teleologically, through the concept of the "end" or "natural end". This vision can be called the "objective point of view" of Kant´s teleology. On the other hand, there are those who argue that we have to comprehend organisms teleologically only on account of the special character of our understanding, by which they mean its discursive character, a perspective that can be called the "ordinary subjective viewpoint" of Kant´s teleological thought. Although both positions find support in the sources that I analyze, that is, a number of passages from the second part of Kant´s Critique of the Power of Judgement (CPJ), I aim to show that both positions encounter significant difficulties and I offer my own answer "a refined subjective point of view" to the question why, according to Kant, the organized being must be judged or thought of teleologically or, in other words, why teleology is referred to organisms.