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The focus on "Aspect-seeing", presented in the second part of Philosophical Investigations (PI II, xi), is often considered the main contribution of Wittgenstein to the discussions around perception. The text gradually delves into the grammar of aspect perception showing that the concept of ´seeing´ founded here is close to our interpretations and resist its separation. But, (a) What is the role that the interpretations fulfil here? (b) How should we understand the link to visual experience? (c) How do we understand the concept of ´seeing´ in the case of aspect perceptions? I will present my position about these three questions through an argument about the use of ´interpretation? in the case of aspect perceptions. In doing so, I will compare this notion with other related uses both in the Tractatus and in the First Part of Philosophical Investigations. This will allow me to sustain (a) that the interpretation fulfils the role of determining the sense of the visually experienced, contributing with a context and pointing out a perspective; (b) that interpretation and perceptual experience maintain, in the case of aspect seeing, at least, an internal-type relationship and (c) that the concept of ´seeing´ can be understood as an ´elastic representation´.