CONICET | Buscador de Institutos y Recursos Humanos

Jeremy Waldron argues for the idea of a self-governing republic. He claims that as a political community we cannot avoid persistent, deep and reasonable disagreements regarding what we should do. He concludes that the majority of our representatives should have the final say in what we should do. He devotes a big part of his scholarship to argue against strong judicial review of legislation ?at least in countries with strong political systems, where it is possible to affirm no one is excluded to have a say and impact in the decision taken by the majority. Constitutions almost always do not determine a resolution that is beyond reasonable dispute. Waldron states that it is our representatives? reading of the Constitution the one that should prevail. Our representatives (typically, legislators) provide us with rules and standards to guide our action. It seems to be assumed by Waldron that these norms can settle the reasonable dispute about how we should act, according to the Constitution. Then, a crucial question arises: how should we interpret those legislative dispositions in order to respect that settlement? In this paper I would like to explore the reach of some Waldron?s theses on legal interpretation and adjudication of ordinary legislation, having in mind the settlement of disputes that, according to him, ordinary legislation aspires to provide. Waldron argues for two further theses. He states that: (i) courts respects human dignity when they take people as ?beings capable of explaining themselves? and (ii) we should be committed to the value of integrity in the task of identifying and applying law to particular cases. I would like to explore the reach of these ideas, given the dignity he wants us to note legislation has.