Le principe de non-contradiction dans le Pyrrhonisme

DIEGO E. MACHUCA

París

Jornada; Journée d'étude "Certitude et Méthode"; 2008

The question of whether the Pyrrhonist adheres to certain logical principles, criteria of justification, and inference rules is without a doubt of central importance for the study of Pyrrhonism. Its significance lies in that, whereas the Pyrrhonist describes his philosophical stance and argues against the Dogmatists by means of what may be considered a rational discourse, adherence to any such principles, criteria, and rules does not seem compatible with the radical character of his Skepticism. Hence, if the Pyrrhonist does endorse them, one must conclude that he is inconsistent in his outlook. Despite its import, the question under consideration has not received, in the vast literature on Pyrrhonism of the past three decades, all the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I do not propose to provide a full examination of the Pyrrhonist?s attitude to rationality, but to focus on the question of whether he endorses the law of non-contradiction. However, given that this law is deemed a fundamental principle of rationality, determining the Pyrrhonist´s attitude towards it will allow us to understand his general attitude towards reason.