Peer Disagreement and Radical Skepticism

DIEGO E. MACHUCA

Miami

Conferencia; Department of Philosophy Colloquium; 2012

University of Miami

In this essay, I wish to focus on the objection frequently raised to conciliationism according to which this view ultimately results in global or nearglobal suspension of judgment. This is considered to be a serious problem for conciliatory views on peer disagreement either because radical skepticism is a patently absurd and untenable stance or because it represents a serious threat to our intellectual and social lives. I will argue that the alleged absurdity or untenability of radical skepticism is far from being evident and should therefore be established rather than taken for granted, and that those who reject radical Skepticism because of the threat it poses confuse pragmatic reasons with epistemic reasons. My purpose is to call attention to what I take to be problematic aspects of the way radical skepticism is treated in the disagreement literature. I am well aware that most people will disagree that the aspects in question are problematic, since most people believe that any form of radical skepticism is clearly unacceptable. Still, I think that a dissenting voice is worth hearing.