The Pyrrhonist's Attitude towards the Law of Non-Contradiction

DIEGO E. MACHUCA

Cambridge

Conferencia; The B Club; 2009

Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge

The question of whether the Pyrrhonist adheres to certain logical principles, criteria of justification, and inference rules is without a doubt of central importance for the study of Pyrrhonism. Its significance lies in that, whereas the Pyrrhonist describes his philosophical stance and argues against the Dogmatists by means of what may be considered a rational discourse, adherence to any such principles, criteria, and rules does not seem compatible with the radical character of his Skepticism. Hence, if the Pyrrhonist does endorse them, one must conclude that he is inconsistent in his outlook. In the present paper, I do not propose to provide a full examination of the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards logic and rationality, but to focus on the question of whether he endorses the law of non-contradiction (hereafter LNC). However, given that the LNC is deemed a fundamental principle of logic and rationality, determining the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards it will allow us to understand his general attitude towards reason.