Leibniz´s ‘Enactive’ Approach to Perception

VARGAS, EVELYN

Houston

Encuentro; The Houston Circle of Modern Philosophy Meeting; 2010

The Houston Circle of Modern Philosophy

My purpose today is to analyze the possible connections between the new understanding of the actions and passions of substances and the new definition of perception as applied to perceptual experience. According to it, Leibniz defines perception as the expression of the many in the one. One of the advantages of this characterization is to extend the ability to perceive to other living creatures since experiencing colors or sounds, etc. does not depend on having conscious thoughts. But it is not evident that perception qua expression can put us in contact with physical objects. We commonly assume that perceiving is something we undergo, or, in Leibniz’s vocabulary, a passion of the soul, while the objects of sense act on us. If, on the other hand, expressing the universe is what souls do, and substances do not interact, it is hard to see how perception understood in terms of expression can account for perceptual knowledge.