Leibniz and Bayle: Two Versions of Pyrrhonism

VARGAS, EVELYN

Studia Leibnitiana

Franz Steiner Verlag

Lugar: Stuttgart; Año: 2015 p. 109 - 125

0039-3185

The relevance of the skeptic tradition in the rise of modern philosophy is widely recognized in recent history of philosophy scholarship. Although the scope of Bayle´s commitment to skepticism is a matter of controversy, the discussion of skeptical themes plays an important role in both Leibniz and Bayle. Early modern authors often used the label ?Pyrrhonian? as equivalent to skeptic, and both Leibniz and Bayle would deal with the notion of Pyrrhonian skepticism in their writings. But before we attempt to propose an interpretation of the significance they attribute to skepticism, we need to clarify what these authors tried to endorse or refute, that is, we need to clarify their conception of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Rather than emphasizing the weakness of human knowledge by raising doubts about the power of reason, as Bayle does, Leibniz would claim that by refuting the skeptic´s arguments that call into question our ability to have justified beliefs, our rational credentials for holding beliefs can be restored. I will examine the grounds for this discrepancy by examining their conceptions of belief and doxastic obligations.