Do not fear opponent: sub-optimal changes of a prevention strategy when facing stronger opponents

DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ SLEZAK; MARIANO SIGMAN

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC

Año: 2011

0022-1015

The time spent making a decision and its quality define a widely studied trade-off. Some models suggest that the time spent is set to optimize reward, as verified empirically in simple-decision making experiments. However, in a more complex perspective compromising components of regulation focus, ambitions, fear, risk and social variables, adjustment of the speed-accuracy trade-off may not be optimal. Specifically, regulatory focus theory shows that people can be set in a promotion mode, were focus is on seeking to approach a desired state (to win), or in a prevention mode, focusing to avoid undesired states (not to lose). In promotion people are eager to take risks increasing speed and decreasing accuracy. In prevention, strategic vigilance increases, decreasing speed and improving accuracy. When time and accuracy have to be compromised one can ask which of these two strategies optimizes reward, leading to optimal performance. We investigate this in a unique experimental environment. We study decision-making in rapid-chess (180 seconds per game) in which the goal of a player is to mate the opponent in a finite amount of time, or, alternatively, time-out of the opponent with sufficient material to mate. In different games, players face strong and weak opponents. We observe that: 1) players adopt a more conservative strategy when facing strong opponents, with slower and more accurate moves; 2) this strategy is suboptimal: players increase their winning likelihood against strong opponents using the policy they adopt when confronting opponents with similar strength.