Empatía y percepción directa de las otras mentes

DANIEL KALPOKAS ; LAURA DANÓN

Horizontes Filosóficos

Departamento de humanidades de la Universidad Nacional del Comahue

Año: 2012 p. 19 - 34

Some philosophers have recently held that we can perceive the minds of others directly. Contrary to authors such as McDowell (1998), Smith (2010) and Cassam (2007), two philosophers of phenomenological orientation -Krueger (2009) and Zahavi (2001)- understand perception of other?s minds as the primary mechanism of empathy. Their main thesis can be understood (i) as holding that direct perception of other?s mental states is equivalent to empathy, or (ii) as holding that empathy is a particular form of perception. In this article we give some reasons to doubt these two ways in which they associate direct perception of others to empathy.