Razones y normatividad en animales no humanos

LAURA DANÓN; DANIEL ENRIQUE KALPOKAS

L'Ircocervo

Fondazione Gentile Onlus

Año: 2022

1722-392X

Abstract: Reasons and Normativity in Non-human AnimalsAccording to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack agenuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considerednormative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at anew doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuinereasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certainkind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by whichthe creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possessionof epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as theintellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals –such as great apes— have the capacity tocarry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a(partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.