Ley y obligación en Kant y en la ética del discurso

DAMIANI ALBERTO MARIO

Ética del discurso y globalización.

Ediciones del ICALA

Lugar: Río Cuarto; Año: 2008; p. 95 - 112

The aim of this paper is to explain the difference and the connection between the moral law (Sittengesetz) and the moral obligation (moraliche Pflicht) in a transcendental-pragmatic frame. In this frame the question is: Why a constitutive condition of discourse can be an ethical principle? The paper begins with a critical presentation of Kants’ dualism. After that, I assert that Kant understand the philosophical problem of the difference and the connection between the moral law and the moral obligation. The discussion between K. O Apel and Karl-Heinz Ilting about the intellectualistic fallacy doesn’t treat this problem. The conclusion is that this problem can be solved in a transcendental-pragmatic frame through the difference between two roles: the role of the discursive interlocutor (Diskurspartner) and the role of the agent in the social interaction.