INVESTIGADORES
MOSCOSO Nebel Silvana
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Obras Sociales Argentinas: Afiliación Compulsiva e Incentivos a la Eficiencia
Autor/es:
MOSCOSO, NEBEL -LAGO, FERNANDO
Lugar:
Còrdoba
Reunión:
Congreso; XLIII Reunión Anual de la ASOCIACIÒN ARGENTINA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA; 2008
Institución organizadora:
Universidad Nacional de Còrdoba
Resumen:
We study the performance of the argentinean union-own health insurance(Obras Sociales,OS) that were excluded from the deregulation reforms.In such institutional context the burocrats in charge of the OS will perform the lowest effort level that is needed to provide the compulsory medical program(PMO).This level is likely to be insuficient to satisfy the demands of medical servicies from the high risk users,whom will promote a veto vote over the politician that appointed the burocrat.The chances of this veto being aproved are higher:i)the higher the proportion of high risk users,ii)the PMO doesn´t fullfill the demands of servicies from the low risk users.
