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This paper presents a novel approach to the well-knownKnapsack problem, extending it as a bilateral negotiating problem withdefault information where each of the two agents has a knapsack andthere is a set of items distributed between them. The agents can exchangeitems in order to reach their goal: fill their knapsacks with items with-out exceeding their capacity with the aim of maximizing their utilityfunction. Initially the agents do not have any information about theircounterpart, e.g. the exact weight of their items and their associatedvalues, so that they consider default assignments for them. This defaultinformation can change as the negotiation progresses. A sequential nego-tiation protocol is proposed, along with different strategies of informa-tion exchange and the results obtained when the agents negotiate usingthem. Information transfer efficiency is assessed in terms of the overallusefulness, quantity of information disclosed and negotiation duration.