INVESTIGADORES
QUINTAS Luis Guillermo
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Shapley Value and Core of Games Modelling Information Transferal
Autor/es:
GALDEANO PATRICIA LUCIA, OVIEDO JORGE Y QUINTAS LUIS GUILLERMO
Lugar:
San Luis , Argentina
Reunión:
Congreso; IX Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Teoria Economica - JOLATE; 2008
Institución organizadora:
JOLATE
Resumen:
In this paper we study the Shapley Value and the Core of a game modelling information transferal. We consider the following problem: There are n firms with similar characteristics; there exists an agent (the innovator) having relevant information for the n firms. The innovator is not going to use the information for himself but he could sell it. The firms acquiring the information will be better than before obtaining it. The problem is modelled as a n+1 players cooperative game. We compute the Core and the Shapley Value. We prove it belongs to the Core. We also present some limit cases including Big Boss Games (Muto, Nakayama, Potters and Tijs (1988)) and Completely Informed Agents.We compare the cooperative outcomes with the unique equilibrium of a noncooperative information transferal game (Quintas (1995)).
