The place of Individual Responsibility in Capability Approach

GARCÍA VALVERDE, FACUNDO

Ciudad de Buenos Aires

Conferencia; 2018 HDCA Conference; 2018

Universidad Católica Argentina - Human Development and Capabilities Association

Unlike inpost-rawlsian discussion of distributive justice, considerations of individualresponsibility are not easily found in capabilitarian literature. There aresome isolated quotes in Nussbaum (2006: 171) and Sen?s texts but there isnothing like a rigorous consideration of how responsibility should modify (ornot) our judgments about individual?s well-being (Robeyns 2017: 107-114). The moreobvious reason for this absence is that capabilitarian literature is mainlyfocused in different dimensions of poverty. It seems reasonable to argue thattracking personal responsibility of the poor would be or too harsh (in cases ofextreme poverty) or too inefficient (as in the case of chronic poverty, whereindividuals usually are born in poor families, towns and countries). However,one of that sparce quotes seems to open some space for considerations ofindividual responsibility specially when individuals are above a threshold ofsufficiency. Sen himself claimed that  ??In dealing with responsible adults, it ismore appropriate to see the claims of individuals on the society (or thedemands of equity or justice) in terms of freedom to achieve rather than actualachievements.If the social arrangements are such that a responsible adult is given no lessfreedom (in terms of set comparisons) than others, but he still wastes theopportunities and ends up worse off  thanothers, it is possible to argue that no unjust inequality may be involved??(1992: 148).The aim ofthis paper is to confront capabilitarian theorists with one of the majornormative challenges of the last twenty years, i.e. how an egalitarian societyshould deal with individuals who decrease their own wellbeing through theirfree individual choices and through the resulting consequences of those choices.Are political communities obligated to keep granting resources to theirimprudent, lazy, and reckless members? Should political communities strive toimprove the wellbeing only of those individuals whose decreased wellbeing is aresult of unchosen circumstances that exceed the person?s control? In short,the main question in this essay is whether the defense of capabilities as themetric of egalitarian justice implies that individual responsibility shouldreduce or expand the distributive obligations of the political community. Ifthe answer is yes, capabilitarian theorists would have to embrace LuckCapabilitarianism, according to which inequalities in real freedoms raiseegalitarian concern only when they result from circumstances that are beyond theindividual?s control.