INVESTIGADORES
WEINSCHELBAUM Federico
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Social Status and Corruption
Autor/es:
SEBASTIAN GALIANI; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM
Lugar:
Bahia Blanca
Reunión:
Conferencia; XLII Reunion Anual Asociacion Argentina de Economia Politica; 2007
Institución organizadora:
Asociacion Argentina de Economia Politica
Resumen:
In this study on the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption in a given society, we show that using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption because a decrease in corruption produces an externality that makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We demonstrate that the existence of this externality reduces the "optimal" level of corruption in a society, since the greaterthe power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.
