"Evolving to the Impatience Trap: the Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game"

DAVID K. LEVINE; SALVATORE MODICA; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM; FELIPE ZURITA

Santiago

Workshop; Latin American Workshop in Economic Theory; 2012

Econometric Society, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Abstract The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game where equilibrium involves threat of punishment, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.