Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

DAVID K. LEVINE; SALVATORE MODICA; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM; FELIPE ZURITA

Lima

Conferencia; Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (Lames); 2012

Universidad del Pacífico

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game where equilibrium involves threat of punishment, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.