Constructing q-cyclic Games with Unique Prefixed Equilibrium

ALANIZ SARA AND QUINTAS LUIS

San Luis Potosi

Jornada; XI JOLATE: The Latin American Meeting on Economic Theory; 2010

ALTE: Asociacion Latinoamericana de Teoria Economica

Abstract: In this work we construct a wide family of q-cyclic n-person gamesbstract: In this work we construct a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games (Marchi and Quintas (1983)) with unique prefixed Nash equilibrium points. We extend the constructions given for bimatrix games by Marchi and Quintas (1987) and Quintas (1988 a). We prove the uniqueness of equilibrium for a wide family of completely mixed q-cyclic game and also for a family of not completely mixed q-cyclic game, with each players having n strategies, being only m (m<n) of them active strategies.