INVESTIGADORES
WEINSCHELBAUM Federico
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
Autor/es:
FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM; DAVID K. LEVINE; SALVATORE MODICA; FELIPE ZURITA
Lugar:
Mar del Plata
Reunión:
Conferencia; XLVI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2011
Institución organizadora:
Universidad de Mar del Plata
Resumen:
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a twopopulation example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
