Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM; DAVID K. LEVINE; SALVATORE MODICA; FELIPE ZURITA

Punta del Este

Conferencia; Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Teoría Económica; 2011

Universidad de la República

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a twopopulation example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.