INVESTIGADORES
WEINSCHELBAUM Federico
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Optimal Nondiscriminatory Auctions with Favoritism
Autor/es:
FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM; LEANDRO AROZAMENA; NICHOLAS SCHUNDA
Lugar:
Notre Dame
Reunión:
Conferencia; Midwest Economic Theory Meeting; 2001
Institución organizadora:
University of Notre Dame
Resumen:
In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller.s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We .nd the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins.
