A metatheoretical approach to (functional) lineage explanations and its consequences for claims about cognitive complexity

SÁNCHEZ, NICOLÁS SEBASTIÁN

Workshop; First Annual Web Conference of the International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind; 2023

International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind

In the context of my PhD in the area of philosophy of mind, I discuss metaphysical questions about where or when intentionality begins. A widely held viewin that area states that to ascribe intentionality to a system, it needs to havespecial psychological capacities -means-end reasoning, senstitivity to mistakes,metacognitive abilities. In this context, I oppose that view and argue for a veryliberal view about which systems are intentional systems.One of my negative arguments is that we should not treat these questions asmetaphysical claims regarding intentionality, but rather as (highly abstract)empirical claims regarding cognitive complexity.• Suggestion: treat those (alleged) metaphysical claims abouta intentionality as (highly abstract) empirical claims regarding cognitive complexitySo, what I take philoosphers to be saying when they distingish between intentional and non-intentional systems in terms of psychological capacities is nothing more than: these systems are more functionally complex (or functionally simpler) than those other systems.• Diagnosis: we don’t have a good account of cognitive complexity, but alsowe do not have a good idea of what would count as a good explanation ofthe evolution of cognitive complexity• Aim of this presentation: to offer the model of lineage explanations as aframework for these kinds of inquiriesThe aim of this presentation then, is to address this second idea of what countsas a good account of the evolution of cognitive complecity and, in particular, topresent the model of lineage explanations as a useful framework for these kindsof inquiries