INVESTIGADORES
DE FAZIO Federico Leandro
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Hans Kelsen´s Pure Theory of Law and the Vienna Circle´s Scientific World Conception. A Meta-theoretical comparison
Autor/es:
DE FAZIO, FEDERICO LEANDRO
Lugar:
Erlangen
Reunión:
Jornada; Recht, Verknunft, Diskurs; 2023
Institución organizadora:
Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Resumen:
The subjectof my presentation is the relationship between Kelsen and the Vienna Circle. However,I´m not going to address this issue from a biographical point of view: Itis well-known that Kelsen was not a member of the Vienna Circle (although they didhave some academic interactions). What interests me, instead, is something lessexplored, namely: the philosophicalrelationship between Kelsen's theory and the Vienna Circle´s one. In otherwords, what I aim to do is a meta-theoretical comparison between bothphilosophical schools.The relevantquestion from this meta-theoretical perspective is the following: Is Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law compatiblewith the Vienna Circle´s logical empiricism? For anyone familiar with Kelsen's work and with some knowledge aboutthe philosophy of the Vienna Circle, the answer to this question might seemclear: They indeed appear tobe incompatible. However, there is virtually no researches devoted toexplaining what are those aspects in which they actually disagree. This islikely the reason why there is still some confusion among jurists regardingthis matter. In fact, it is quite common to hear things such as: 'Kelsen wasinfluenced by the Vienna Circle' or that 'Kelsen was an analytical philosopher'.So, the purpose of my research is to fill this gap and elucidate thedifferences that explain the case for the incompatibility between Kelsen's PureTheory of Law and the Vienna Circle´s logical empiricism. Thehypothesis I´d like to present is the following: Beyond some marginalcoincidences, the main reason for the incompatibility between Kelsen's PureTheory of Law and the Vienna Circle's logical empiricism lies in theirdifferent views on three fundamental issues related to the philosophy ofscience, namely: 1) the way knowledge can be founded, 2) the meaning or logicalstructure of scientific sentences, and 3) the nature of social sciences.
