INVESTIGADORES
WEINSCHELBAUM Federico
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry
Autor/es:
LEANDRO AROZAMENA; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM
Lugar:
Buenos Aires
Reunión:
Encuentro; Joint International Meeting Association of Latin-Iberoamerican Operational Research Societies e Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences; 2010
Institución organizadora:
Association of Latin-Iberoamerican Operational Research Societies e Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Resumen:
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller´swelfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unlessthe seller values those bidders´ welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatoryauction is optimal.
