Valor de Shapley para familias de coaliciones

AGUILERA, NESTOR EDGARDO; DI MARCO, SILVIA CRISTINA; ESCALANTE, MARIANA

Cartagena de Indias, Colombia

Congreso; XIV Congreso Latino-Ibero-Americano en Investigación de Operaciones (CLAIO’08); 2008

ALIO

We address the problem of nding a suitable definition of a valuesimilar to that of Shapley´s, when the games are defined on a subfamilyof coalitions with no structure. We present two frameworks: one based onthe familiar eficiency, linearity and null player axioms, and the other onlinearity and the behavior on unanimity games. We give several propertiesand examples in each case, and give necessary and suficient conditionson the family of coalitions for the approaches to coincide.