Anti-exceptionalim, Truth and the BA Plan

BARRIO, EDUARDO ALEJANDRO; PAILOS, FEDERICO MATÍAS; TORANZO CALDERÒN, JOAQUÌN

SYNTHESE (DORDRECHT)

SPRINGER

Lugar: Berlin; Año: 2021

0039-7857

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the approach that logical theories have nospecial epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include data about semantic paradoxes as a part of the logicalevidence. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferentialhierarchy of ST-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes.There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which LP and ST itself are only the first steps. Thelogics in this hierarchy and STω are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowedin a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responsesanalyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP, ST and the logics ofthe ST-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data isnot enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revisionof classical logic. How close should we be to classical logic? Which logic should be usedduring the revision? Should a logic be closed under its own rules? How could a logic obeythe validities they contain? And mainly, Which is the best explanation of the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? We will argue that, if the answers to these questionsare provided by an anti-exceptionalist perspective, ST-metainferential logics in general?andSTTω in particular?are the best available options.