Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts

PEREZ, DIANA INÉS

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

University of Calgary Press

Lugar: Calgary, Alberta; Año: 2004 vol. 30 p. 201 - 225

0229-7051

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that mental concepts are natural kind concepts. By ?mental concepts? I mean the ordinary words belonging to our everyday languages (English, Spanish, and so on) that we use in order to describe our mental life. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I shall present the hypothesis: firstly, I shall present a theory about the meaning of natural kind concepts following Putnam?s 1975 proposal, with some modifications; secondly, I shall present a taxonomy of mental concepts and, thirdly, I shall explain what the meaning of each kind of mental concept would be on the hypothesis defended in this paper. In the second part of the paper, I shall present two interesting consequences of the hypothesis proposed: first, that it is preferable to avoid a certain way of conceiving phenomenal concepts which does not fit with the hypothesis proposed; second, that folk psychology could fruitfully be considered a theory, and why, ultimately, it will not be eliminated.(El adjunto es una galera que incluye otras artículos de la revista, además del mío)