Why should our mind reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?

PÉREZ, DIANA INÉS

Análisis Filosófico

Sadaf

Lugar: Buenos Aires; Año: 2008 vol. 28 p. 35 - 48

0326-1301

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend FOR from Carruthers´ attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers´ misunderstanding. In the last section, I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness