Freedom and Epistemic Determinism in Epictetus' Discourses

BRAICOVICH, RODRIGO SEBASTIÁN

The Classical Quarterly

The Classical Association

Lugar: Oxford; Año: 2010 vol. 60 p. 202 - 220

0009-8388

The aim of my paper is to analyse the connection between Epictetus´ conception of freedom and the concept of ´that which depends on us´. I shall claim that the textual evidence provided by the Discourses not only precludes indeterminist interpretations of the issue but also requires that we interpret Epictetus´ conception of freedom as a solid and uncompromising defence of a specific type of determinism (I shall call it epistemic determinism), which states the impossibility of withholding assent to that which appears to be convenient. The acceptance of this principle, as I shall try to demonstrate, has direct consequences on our understanding of Epictetus´ conception of the problem of incontinence (akrasia) and of the problem of moral responsibility.