Theory-construction in comparative cognition: assessing the case of animal normativity

SÁNCHEZ, NICOLÁS SEBASTIÁN

ARTEFACTOS

Universidad de Salamanca

Lugar: Salamanca; Año: 2023

With an extensive amount of research on the social lives of primates, Frans de Waal has been apioneering advocate for the continuity of human and non-human minds, putting forward theidea that these creatures exhibit rudimentary political and moral behaviors. One of the traitswhich de Waal focuses on is animal normativity, a set of behaviors functionally defined asadherence to social standards. Recently, some philosophers have endorsed this position,holding that animals show a psychological capacity called normative cognition underlying thoseand other social behaviors. In this paper, I assess whether advocacy for animal normativity isan exercise of theory construction in comparative cognition. To that end, I present threefeatures of this kind of theory construction. First, the explanatory goal of building functionalanalyses of cognitive capacities. Second, the conceptual aid of comparative thinking for theoryconstruction. Third, the heuristic value of theory in specifying possible roads of inquiry.Taking these features into account, I assess whether the claims advocates make regardinganimal normativity consider them. My answer is negative. First, since some advocates focus on behavioral traits and not on psychological capacities, they are not producing theory incomparative cognition, although, as I argue, they should. Second, there is a disregard forhypothesis testing and no evolutionary considerations to support their views. Finally, the claimthat non-human animals exhibit normativity does not seem to have heuristic value.