IIESS   23418
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DEL SUR
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
artículos
Título:
Optimal contracts with hidden information: an export consortium case
Autor/es:
ALDERETE MARÍA VERÓNICA
Revista:
Revista Brasilera de Economía de Empresas
Editorial:
UNIVERSA
Referencias:
Lugar: Brasilia; Año: 2011 vol. 10 p. 70 - 86
ISSN:
1676-8000
Resumen:
This paper analyzes the creation
of an export consortium among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the
State. A hidden information principal agent model is introduced to explain the
presence of SME export consortiums. The State (principal) can not observe the
random realization of the firms (agent) disutility from effort. We introduce a
setting where the informational asymmetry is post-contractual. The contract
specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from different
announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, the
revelation of firms competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are
that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the
participation of the less competitive firms to the export consortium.