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As it is usually recognized, Dewey´s pragmatism can be understood as a critical endeavor and even as a philosophy of (cultural) criticism. This undertaking is not only built upon the pragmatist conception of beliefs as habits and of habits as practices but also upon the rejection of the dichotomy between genesis and validity. A similar dichotomy has played a major role within the 20th Century philosophy of science and through it, within logic and the theory of rationality. As it is well known, the difference between context of discovery and of justification has been a fundamental distinction to establish the boundaries within which the epistemological and philosophical criticism should focus. This dichotomy is commonly attributed to Hans Reichenbach?s Experience and Prediction (1938) and would have fallen apart with the appearance on the scene of the historical turn as represented by Thomas Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin in philosophy as well as by David Bloor and Barry Barnes in Sociology of Science, to mention a few. However, a similar dichotomy had been established earlier (Cohen, 1914) and at least since the beginning of 20th Century had been a prime target for Dewey?s criticism. This paper focuses on Dewey?s rejection of this dichotomy and in his grasp of the relevance of genesis to establish the validity of moral practices and beliefs. This genealogical character has been pointed as a general trait of Dewey?s philosophy, one that connects his pragmatism with Foucault?s post-structuralism (e.g. Stuhr, 1997; Colapietro 2012). Indeed, the history and genesis of ideas are crucial in Dewey?s attempt to give a ?scientific? treatment to morality. According to him, it is only by considering the genesis or history of a moral belief that its validity can be evaluated and eventually established. Consequently, it can be argued that something like a genealogical critique of beliefs and values is a keystone in Dewey?s stance.