IDIHCS   22126
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES EN HUMANIDADES Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Genesis and Values in Dewey´s Critical Pragmatism: a further reply to White
Autor/es:
FEDERICO E. LÓPEZ; LIVIO MATTAROLLO
Lugar:
Sao Paulo
Reunión:
Congreso; 18th International Meeting on Pragmati; 2018
Institución organizadora:
Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo - PUCSP
Resumen:
Contrary to some misinterpretations, Dewey's pragmatism can be understood as acritical endeavor and, what is more, as a philosophy of (cultural) criticism. This undertakingis not only built upon the pragmatist conception of beliefs as habits and of habits as practicesbut also on the rejection of the dichotomy between genesis and validity. A similar dichotomyhas played a major role within the Twenty Century Philosophy of Science. As it is wellknown, the difference between context of discovery and of justification has been afundamental distinction to establish the boundaries within which the epistemological andphilosophical criticism should focus. According to the philosophical mainstream, thisdichotomy fell apart with the appearance on the scene of the historical turn as representedby Thomas Kuhn, or Stephen Toulmin in philosophy and by David Bloor and Barry Barnes inSociology of Science, to mention a few. However, this dichotomy or distinction, commonlyattributed to Hans Reichenbach?s Experience and Prediction (1938), was already availableearlier at the beginning of Twentieth Century (Cohen, 1914) and had been a prime target forDewey?s criticism since the beginning of that Century.This paper focuses on Dewey?s rejection of this dichotomy and in his grasp of therelevance of genesis to establish the value of beliefs and practices. Although this is alsofundamental in Dewey?s conception of science and knowledge in general. What is more, thisgenealogical character has been pointed as a general trait of Dewey?s philosophy (e.g.Stuhr, 1997; Colapietro 2012), one that connects his pragmatism with Foucault?s post-structuralism. This paper focuses on the relevance of genesis in his understanding of(reflective) ethics and moral values. Indeed, the history and genesis of ideas is particularlyimportant in Dewey?s attempt to give a ?scientific? treatment to morality. According to Dewey,it is only by considering the genesis or history of a moral belief that its validity can beevaluated and eventually established. Consequently, it can be argued that something like agenealogical critique of beliefs and values is a keystone in Dewey?s stance.However, Dewey?s conception of values has been profoundly criticized. Particularlyrelevant is Morton White?s criticism of Dewey?s (and C. I Lewis?s) ethics. Indeed, in hisopinion ?pragmatism is without a solution of the fundamental problem of ethics? (White,1949, p. 329). This criticism has been highly influential and has been understood as one ofthe major causes of the log time sustained idea that pragmatism is a defective philosophy.(Gouinlock, 1978). Despite the fact that Dewey (1950, lw.17.480-84), among others (Hook,1950 Gouinlock, 1978), replied to this criticism, in 1996 White insisted on it, wich hasprovoked a recent revisit by Robert Sinclair (2014). This latter analysis throws light on someconfusing topics and moves in this controversy, but it overlooks the relevance of history andgenesis in his approach to ethical beliefs and practices. Thus, to conclude this paper,Sinclair's analysis is expanded in order to offer a further reply to White.