Plato’s Sophist on Negation and Not-Being

FABIAN MIE

Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘Parmenides, venerable and awsome’ (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)

Parmenides Publishing

Lugar: Las Vegas; Año: 2011; p. 361 - 370

This brief paper develops an interpretation of Plato’s theory ofnegation understood as an answer to Parmenides’ paradoxes concerningnot-being. First, I consider some aspects that result from an analysis ofSophist 257b–259d, formulating some general theses which I then go onto unfold in more detail in the following section. Finally, I show whatexactly Plato’s so-called overcoming of the Eleatic problem related tonegation and falsehood is; and I outline some of the main semantic andmetaphysical consequences that are entailed by this overcoming.