Plato’s Sophist on Negation and Not-Being

FABIAN MIE

Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘Parmenides, venerable and awsome’ (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)

Parmenides Publishing

Lugar: Las Vegas; Año: 2009;

At the end of the passage in Platos’s Sophist which is dedicated to the analysis of the combination between the great kinds emerges the thesis according to which the not-being must be firmly established as something that is not, and like every idea, as something which has its own nature. This may be the main result of the investigation that was meant to examine the problems of the Parmenidean dictum, expressed in the only possible way that fragment 2 of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. the combination between the great kinds emerges the thesis according to which the not-being must be firmly established as something that is not, and like every idea, as something which has its own nature. This may be the main result of the investigation that was meant to examine the problems of the Parmenidean dictum, expressed in the only possible way that fragment 2 of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. Sophist which is dedicated to the analysis of the combination between the great kinds emerges the thesis according to which the not-being must be firmly established as something that is not, and like every idea, as something which has its own nature. This may be the main result of the investigation that was meant to examine the problems of the Parmenidean dictum, expressed in the only possible way that fragment 2 of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. dictum, expressed in the only possible way that fragment 2 of the Poem declares viable, the one which consists in that being is and not-being is not (fr. 2, 3). This same way – Parmenides’ Way of Truth in the Poem – had also been judged in the dialogue from 241d7 clearly as paradoxically not viable since Parmenides’ theory did not allow to explain one of our most elementary comprehensive abilities, the one that allows us to operate with the negation and to admit the possibility of the falsehood. Plato’s idea is that if not-being were not accepted, the falsehood would not be possible (237a3-4; 241a9-b3). The postulation of the idea of not-being as a necessary condition to justify some of our basic linguistic practices as well as the use of negative predicates and the meaning of false statements constitutes, therefore, a first relevant topic of the Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. Sophist. A second one, on which I will also focus on this paper, is an ontological one. It lies namely in the formulation of some metaphysical central tools which introduce clearly anti-Eleatic features in our ontology. The main metaphysical tool of Platos’s Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. Sophist consists in accepting not-being in the only admissible sense of it, that is to say, as difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. difference (255b3-4, c8-10, d1), and rejecting the ontological monism that Plato considers directly associated with an erroneous semantic that, finally, does not account for predication and in which there only exist names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate. apparently name the only reality of its correlate. names which, would apparently name the only reality of its correlate.