Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

P. GONZÁLEZ; L REBÓN; T. FERREIRA DA SILVA; M. FIGUEROA; C. SAAVEDRA; M. CURTY; G. LIMA; G. B. XAVIER; W. A. T. NOGUEIRA

PHYSICAL REVIEW A - ATOMIC, MOLECULAR AND OPTICAL PHYSICS

AMER PHYSICAL SOC

Lugar: New York; Año: 2015 vol. 92 p. 223371 - 223378

1050-2947

Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device independentQKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.