Agency and Mental Judgement

LAWLER, DIEGO

Madrid, España.

Workshop; Mind and Language; 2008

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

This presentation takes as its point of departure the following question: How could we make sense of a mental activity (that is, theoretical deliberation) that aims at acquiring true beliefs about the world, but at the same time has its source in the subject’s agential condition, i.e. a realm that seems to be governed by the exercise of her freedom? My general aim is to focus on delineating different ways of thinking about theoretical deliberation as a mental activity in the context of a belief acquisition. Although my general purpose is to encourage some intuitive support for the notion of theoretical deliberation within a cognitive context, I hope to extract a precise sense in which the subject is active in the process of deliberation, and to discuss also in what sense this kind of activity can be regarded as a case of rational agency. This presentation is organized in three sections. In the first section, I diagnose two intuitions we find ourselves with when we reflect on the process of deliberation or making up our mind on a question. In the second and third sections, I advance two models for cashing out these two different intuitions. In particular, in the second section, I present and discuss the Crystallisation Model. In the third section, I analyze the Active Model and explore two possible readings of this model. In the last section, I attempt a diagnosis of the respective weaknesses and strengths of these two models for thinking about theoretical deliberation and the respective sense of rational agency involved.  My purpose is to pave the way for adjudicating between these two models.