LARROSA Juan Manuel Ceferino
congresos y reuniones científicas
Exogenous and Endogenous Timing in Non Cooperative Stackelberg Networks
LARROSA, JUAN M.C.
Jornada; IX Jornada de Difusión de Investigaciones; 2006
Non cooperative network formation games analyze linking as representing the firms appropriation of cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situation where one firm access to another firms information without reciprocity. We first study a case of exogenous timing in a Stackelberg leadership game: one firm is randomly selected for moving first. This selection has been criticized because of its arbitrariness and lack of internal fundamental in the framework of the game about how this process has been created. Finally, we developed a Stackelberg leadership game where multiple potential equilibria are found and we focus on equilibrium selection procedures for choosing the most probable one.