INVESTIGADORES
MORO Rodrigo
artículos
Título:
The effect of social norms on bribe offers
Autor/es:
ABBINK, KLAUS; FREIDIN, ESTEBAN; GANGADHARAN, LATA; MORO, RODRIGO
Revista:
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Editorial:
Oxford University Press
Referencias:
Lugar: Kettering; Año: 2018 vol. 34 p. 457 - 474
ISSN:
8756-6222
Resumen:
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptivesocial norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants whoknew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority ofcorrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. Thiseffect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.