Concept pluralism and multiple realization

BARBERIS, SERGIO

Buenos Aires

Workshop; II Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science; 2010

PICT-CONICET 2531

I propose that Weiskopf´s account of functional kinds can give some fresh air to the debate between concept pluralism and eliminativism. Instead of searching for arguable empirical generalizations or law-like statements beyond those functional “analytical” generalizations associated with the class of concepts, we can focus our attention on those well-confirmed psychological models that postulate processes ranging over prototypes, exemplars and theories (PET), so to speak, at the same time. If PET play an important role in a model that turn out to be empirically applicable on a wide range of behavioral experimental settings – that is, if PET play a relevant role in a model whose intended empirical applications include a diversity of experimental effects – then we would have good reasons to accept that PET exist and that they conform a legitimate kind. I think that here is where pluralist psychological models of concept combination, such as R3 of Costello and Keane (2000) and the RCA model of Prinz (2002) are supposed to play their part. In this sense, concept pluralism would adjust itself to the (vaguely) quinean dictum according to which our ontological commitments are supervenient on our best scientific theories (Moulines 2008). In certain sense, the HPC approach turns the thing upside down: it advances an ontological commitment that is in the search of a scientific theory.