Spurious Multiple Realizations

BARBERIS, SERGIO

Workshop; IV Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science / IV Encuentro de Filosofía y Ciencia Cognitiva; 2014

Universidad de Buenos Aires

I argue that the dimensioned view of realization lacks the conceptual resources that are necessary to characterize multiple realizability. In particular, the dimensioned view (but not the standard view) faces the problem of spurious multiple realizations. By transitivity of realization, if M realizes N and N realizes P, then M realizes P. But, by negation of token-identity theory, it could be the case that M and N are relevantly distinct realizations of P, thus P would be multiply realized, but in a spurious way. Those who endorse the dimensioned view try to solve this problem by constraining potential multiple realizations to alternative realizations at the same scientific level of mechanism. I argue, in the first place, that the notion of level of mechanism cannot solve the problem of spurious multiple realizations. Secondly, I show that even if the dimensioned view had a working account of levels, the problem would re-emerge for property instances at the same scientific level. Finally, I hypothesize that the vera causa of the problem of spurious realizations for the dimensioned view lies in the rejection of token-identity theory.